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1. INTRODUCTION
The possibility of insider trading is an important concern in financial
markets. Incentives promoting it are clear in the huge flows of funds, whilst
the relative anonymity afforded to investors is an advantage. Stakeholder fears
about the possibility of market abuses justify the power and funding given to
regulators such as SEC and NYSE in the United States and ASIC and ASX in
Australia. And reminders that at least some abuses occur come through the
occasional prosecution, including such high profile insiders as Martha Stewart
and Rene Rivkin.
Despite the apparent importance of insider trading to scholars and
investors, its extent and impact are difficult to quantify because most financial
markets are characterized by continuous flows of information and the lack of a
clear end point. Thus analyses are typically constrained to anecdotal evidence
and indirect measures.
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There is, however, one group of important financial markets where it is
possible to quantify insider trading. These comprise wagering markets, where
data is comprehensive and readily available. The flows of funds are large, with
real money at stake: in Australia, for instance, around $US10 billion is wagered
on racing each year,with $300million going to taxes and about $1.3 billion to the
operators (TasmanianGamingCommission, 2003).Bettors have access to a large
amount of relatively cheap information; these markets are clearly competitive;
and there is extensive prudential supervision of the industry (by ‘the stewards’
and others) to prevent manipulation of race results and returns from betting.
Wagering markets have the significant advantages (for financial analysts) of
being isolated from external influences, with a fixed stock of information, and a
common structure around the world. Participants know payouts in advance, and
each bet has a clearly defined value and end point (Brailsford, Easton, Gray and
Gray, 1995). Sauer (1998) and Thaler and Ziemba (1988) give comprehensive
reviews of the literature, whilst innovative contributions have been made by
Busche and Walls (2000), Johnson and Bruce (2001), Levitt (2004), Schnytzer
and Shilony (1995), and Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997).
Wagering markets are a wonderful natural laboratory to study the
behavior of financial decision makers who face risk and uncertainty. As they
share many of the characteristics of other financial markets, conclusions in
relation to insider wagering point to what is probably happening in
qualitatively similar financial markets where financial flows are large and
supervision is strong. This has been clear since Thaler and Ziemba (1988:
161–2) commenced their series of articles on market anomalies in the Journal
of Economic Perspectives with the observation: “Economists have given
attention to stock markets in their efforts to test the concepts of market
efficiency and rationality. Yet wagering markets are . . . better suited . . . ”
Although there have been a number of studies of insider trading
in wagering markets, none has used a long term dataset covering both pari-
mutuel and bookmaker markets on the same races. Moreover no previous
study has developed and tested a comprehensive set of hypotheses of market
biases that would arise from insider activity. Thus the contribution (and
innovation) of this paper is to use new data and a new analytical approach to
answer two research questions: what is the extent of insider trading in
wagering markets? And has this figure changed through the last decade?
Results are conclusive. Empirical measures show that insiders place just
over two percent of all bets accepted by bookmakers, and about half of one
percent in the much larger pari-mutuel market. Both markets are biased as
expected by the presence of insiders, and their impact has increased
significantly over the last decade.
The balance of the paper proceeds in four parts. Section I reviews previous
studies, whilst section II introduces relevant features of wagering markets and
describes the setting and data for this study. Sections III and IV, respectively,
report the analytical results and discuss the findings, including broader
financial implications and suggestions for further research.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The issue of inside or informed trading in financial markets has an
understandable attraction for finance scholars. Fama (1970) promoted interest
by a discussion of ‘strong efficiency’, which means that no investor can profit
from information that is not available to the general public. Tests for market
inefficiency date back to Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) who looked at
the rate that stock prices adjust to new information (which relates to ‘semi
strong’ efficiency) and published the classic event study.
A stimulus to analysis of strong efficiency and a challenge to the concept
of efficiency in general is the inability of publicly available information to
explain market moves. For instance, Fair (2002) tracked the United States
S&P 500 futures contract between 1982 and 1999 to identify moves of greater
than 0.75 percent within any five minutes (about seven standard deviations
above average). He found 1,159 examples, and then searched newswires at
that hour, but found that 90 percent of these extreme moves had no identifiable
cause from outside the market.
Although the literature now displays considerable interest in the existence
of strong inefficiency, virtually all evidence is obtained indirectly. In a typical
example, Rafferty and Tomljanovich (2002) studied the bond market around
the 1994 decision by the US Federal Reserve Board to immediately publish
changes in its monetary policy. They found that the market became more
efficient at predicting future interest rate movements, and thus provided less
opportunity for insider profits.
Most tests of strong efficiency use event studies of market reaction around
significant announcements ranging from CEO turnover (Niehaus and Roth,
1999) and grant of executive stock options (Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001) to
new listings (Webb, 1999) and takeovers (Jayaraman, Frye and Sabherwal,
2001). A further set of studies has examined the extent to which some classes
of investors are able to ‘beat the market’, with the presumption that this is at
least partly due to their ability to access information that is not generally
available. Possible inside investors include directors (Hillier and Marshall,
2002) and professional fund managers (Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 2004).
A large scale study of stock price changes around acquisition
announcements by Bris (2005) concluded that insiders made positive returns
in at least 30 percent of this sample of transactions. Cornell and Sirri (1992)
obtained detailed records of trading in a takeover firm during the month before
its acquisition and found insiders bought 29 percent of the stock sold.
Meulbroek (1992) examined cases of insider trading detected by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and concluded that insiders were responsible for
most of the abnormal trading volume prior to the market sensitive
announcement, and caused about half the pre-announcement price move.
Although the general conclusion of such studies is that there is statistically
significant evidence of insider trading in many financial markets, some results
may be an artifact of the study methodology (Eckbo and Smith, 1998).
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This makes it desirable to quantify the extent of insider trading and any
change in its incidence.
The difficulties of measuring insider activity in financial markets have
encouraged analysts to turn to wagering markets where investors (‘bettors’)
who outperform the general public can be conveniently thought of as falling
into two groups. One uses publicly available information, but processes it with
superior skill. This could be achieved by technology, such as sophisticated
analysis of comprehensive databases or intensive scrutiny of race videos.
In other cases, it might be more intuitive. Such skilled bettors - ‘professionals’
to many people – do not invalidate strong market efficiency, and there is
considerable (if largely anecdotal) evidence to suggest they are active
(e.g. Kaplan, 2002).
The second group of bettors who enjoy superior financial returns make use
of information that is not generally available. The sources of knowledge
exploited by these true insiders are legion. For instance, owners, jockeys,
trainers and industry figures with special access might become aware that a
horse is to run particularly well or badly. Whatever the source of insiders’
information, it is not publicly available.
Studies on Australian racetracks by Tuckwell (1983), Bird and McCrae
(1987), and Schnytzer and Shilony (1995) show that insiders have been
operating there for over 20 years. In fact, someone who is not knowledgeable
about thoroughbred racing could be forgiven if they concluded from press
reports that the industry is massively corrupt. Consider some headlines from
Australian daily newspapers whilst this paper was being researched:
. Sydney vet in hot water [The Sunday Age 23 May 2004]
. Robinson escapes riding ban [The Australian 25 May 2004]
. Stewards focus on bookie’s contacts [The Australian 29 May 2004]
. Stewards fine trainers over rule breaches [The Australian 19 June 2004]
. TAB tickets used to launder cash [The Australian 7 July 2004]
. Jockey out for six months [The Age 17 July 2004]
. Stewards take no action in probe over jumps jockey’s call [The Age 24
July 2004]
. Swab sparks corruption probe [The Australian 30 July 2004]
. Jockey outed for betting against himself [Sunday Age 26 September
2004]
. [Bookmaker] Read meets stewards over ‘fixing’ claims [The Australian
23 November 2004]
. Melbourne bookie gets 12-month ban for accepting illegal phone bets
[The Australian 22 December 2004]
. [Jockey] Nikolic under the whip at hearing [The Australian 6 October
2005]
. Nationwide sting hits greyhound racing [The Age 21 December 2005]
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Vaughan Williams (2005) provides a comprehensive survey of efficiency
in betting markets. Gandar, Dare, Brown and Zuber (1998) provide an
introduction to the literature on insider trading in wagering markets; and
recent thinking is summarized by Cain, Law and Peel (2001).
Historical studies of insider betting have pursued a variety of analytical
strategies, with a recent trend towards quantifying its level.
Gabriel and Marsden (1990) compared bookmaker dividends and Tote
dividends for the winners of UK thoroughbred races during the 1978 season,
and found large, highly significant differences that persisted even after outliers
were removed and across different periods. They argued that the dividends
represent essentially identical financial claims and so should converge over
time. Thus the gap is evidence that the market is not semi strong efficient
(i.e. prices do not fully reflect all publicly available information), and perhaps
is also subject to insider trading.
Another set of studies has tested for the presence of monopolistic
information; this typically involves tipsters who are the most clearly
identifiable group with potential insider knowledge. The general conclusion is
that tipsters are able to match the accuracy and financial return of the wagering
market (Vaughan Williams, 2000). This has proven true in thoroughbred
wagering markets in the UK (Dowie, 1976), United States (Snyder, 1978) and
Australia (Bird and McCrae, 1987).
An important group of studies has measured the extent of insider trading.
For the 1973 UK flat racing season, Dowie (1976) examined changes in
betting odds between those forecast the previous day and odds at the start of
the race, and concluded that insider trading is not significant. Crafts (1985)
took a similar, but more sophisticated, approach for a four-month period in
1982–3 and reversed Dowie’s conclusion.
Shin (1993) examined 136 UK races in 1991 and found that bookmakers’
margin is related to the number of runners, presumably because bookmakers
use bigger fields to recoup losses to insiders. He developed a methodology to
calculate insider activity and found that about two percent of bets were from
insiders.
Schnytzer and Shilony (1995) made creative use of data taken from the
pari-mutuel betting market in Melbourne to compare activities in parallel
markets that would reveal availability of monopoly information. They
generally foundweak evidence of insider trading, and concluded it is declining.
Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997) examined the link between
bookmakers’ take and number of runners using high-grade handicaps, which
have the greatest amount of media attention that should reduce the value of
privately held information. They found that bookmakers’ margin increases
when the winning horses’ odds shorten significantly during betting (implying
greater insider activity), but decreases with high-grade races (implying less
insider trading, although the latter is strongly correlated to the number of
runners). They determined that insiders place about 2.1 percent of bets in lower
grade races, but only a third as much in higher handicap races.
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Cain, Law and Peel (2003) followed Shin’s methodology to evaluate
bookmaker betting markets in eight sports and found a level of insider trading
between 1.9 and 7.8 percent of wagers. Coleman and McGrath (2005)
analyzed pari-mutuel bets in Melbourne and estimated that up to ten percent of
bets by value are from insiders. Fingleton and Waldron (2001) estimated that
around four percent of betting in Ireland is by bettors with inside information.
Although there is an impressive literature on wagering market biases and
efficiency, a significant limitation is its fragmented nature with many studies
covering short time periods and only one of the pari-mutuel and bookmaker
markets. Moreover, few studies develop cause-and-effect relationships
surrounding wagering markets that enable rigorous tests of their efficiency.
3. DESCRIPTION OF MELBOURNE WAGERING MARKETS
Gambling on thoroughbred races is legal in Australia, and is principally
conducted through on-course bookmakers and the pari-mutuel system, or
totalisator (‘Tote’). Since 1979, the Tote’s share of the betting market has
steadily risen from about 60 percent to above 85 percent (Tasmanian Gaming
Commission, 2003).
Bookmakers offer fixed odds and compete for bets through an open outcry
system; they pay a turnover tax. Bookmakers display the odds on a board, and
alter them at their discretion in response to demand (bets placed) and supply
(bookmakers’ preferences and competitive factors). The first price that is
displayed after the market reaches initial equilibrium is called Opening Price
(OP); fluctuations in dividends are typically recorded on two or three
subsequent occasions, with the last being the average bookmakers’ dividend at
the commencement of the race (‘starting price’, SP).
Bets with the Tote are placed electronically, by telephone, or by means of
machine readable cards at Tote offices. To calculate dividends, the Tote
deducts a fixed proportion of all bets to cover taxes and operating costs, and
divides the balance between winning bets. The Tote has no control over the
odds which change directly in response to investments during the betting
period, and are continually displayed at its offices and on the Internet.
Dividends are reported after the market has stabilized, and at three or four
subsequent points in the betting: 15 minutes before the start, sometimes one
minute before the start, at the start, and one minute after the start.
Effectively bets with a bookmaker are at a marginal price, whereas
dividends paid by the Tote are an average; in practice the distinction is
minimal as most bets are placed close to the start of the race
1
.
Most races (almost 90 percent) in Melbourne are handicap events. The
handicapper employed by the Racing Clubs evaluates the prospects of each
horse, and – to give all runners an equal chance - assigns horses a minimum
weight to be carried by the jockey. Each horse is then assigned a TAB number
which starts at 1 for the highest weighted horse and so on down.
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Because success in wagering is assumed to require skill, the racing
industry supports a wide range of experts - ‘tipsters’ - who publish their
forecasts of winners in newspapers and other media. They typically provide
three horses in predicted finishing order, sometimes with a selection of best
bet(s). A difficulty in using tipster forecasts is that their motivations are
unstated, so it is only assumed they unconditionally seek to maximize the
accuracy of their tips, and not (say) choose ‘value’ horses. In addition, it is
hard to quantify tipsters’ credentials and intellectual input; so differences in
their inherent skill cannot be quantified.
Because tipsters finalize their predictions at least 12–24 hours before any
meaningful market is formed, they rely solely on their individual skill (and
specialist knowledge) and so are a measure of the value of information other
than that contained in the wagering market. Thus an independent estimate of a
horse’s probability of winning can be derived from tipster forecasts.
3.1 Quantifying Wagering Markets
The following analysis uses the definitions and nomenclature which have
usually been followed since first established by Griffith (1949) and Ali (1977).
Consider there are n horses in a race, which are numbered in decreasing
order of favoritism as 1,2... h...n. Let X
h
be the amount bet for a win on horse
h. In a pari-mutuel market, a proportion of the pool equal to a is taken out by
the Tote to cover taxes and operating costs. Thus the win dividend paid by the
Tote on any horse is:
D
h
¼
ð12 aÞ
P
n
h¼1
X
h
X
h
ð1Þ
The subjective probability that any horse will win, p
h
, is established by
bettor preferences and is equal to the proportion of the pool that is bet on any
horse:
p
h
¼
X
h
P
n
h¼1
X
h
¼
12 a
a
h
þ 1
ð2Þ
where a
h
is the win odds on any horse, and equals (D
h
–1):1.
This value of p
h
needs adjusting because dividends in Melbourne are
rounded down to the nearest ten cents (rounding down occurs in virtually all
pari-mutuel markets, and can be as high as to the nearest 20 cents). Thus
reported dividends will on average be five cents less than the exact dividend.
In the calculations below, five cents has been added to the reported dividend
before calculation of p
h
.
The objective probability that any horse will win, p
h
, is not directly
observable. Most studies calculate it as the proportion of times a horse starting
at any particular odds has historically won. This is determined by grouping
starters according to win dividend and then dividing the number of winners in
each group by the total runners.
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Using simple math, the expressions above can be used to develop a
measure of insider activity in the Tote market. Assume a wagering market
which is efficient and has no bias: p
h
equals p
h
, so that market odds
accurately reflect each horse’s objective probability of winning; and the
expected return at all odds is the same (and equal to the operator’s negative
take). Now consider that insiders (who possess information not available to
other bettors) become involved. Let the amount they wager equal i
proportion of the bets by ‘outsiders’, and assume that it is invested
exclusively on the winner. If D
*
w
is the dividend on the winner in a market
where insiders operate:
D
*
w
¼
Net Amount Bet on the Race
Amount bet on winning horse w
¼
ð12 aÞ
*
ðTotal Bets of ‘Outsiders’Þ
*
ð1þ iÞ
ðp
w
þ iÞ
*
ðTotal Bets of ‘Outsiders’Þ
¼
ð12 aÞ
*
ð1þ iÞ
ðp
w
þ iÞ
ð3Þ
From above : D
*
w
¼
ð12aÞ
p
w
Therefore for any one race; x : i
x
¼
p
w
2p
w
12p
w
ð4Þ
where p
w
and p
w
relate to the winner.
The relationship shown in equation (4) is the classic longshot bias where
the objective probability of a win by a short priced horse is greater than its
subjective probability (and the subjective probability of a longshot’s win is
less than its objective probability). The strength of the longshot bias is a
measure of insider betting, which implies the logical behavior that
knowledgeable bettors are more likely to bet on favorites
2
.
A more complicated approach that can be applied to bookmaker markets
with qualitatively similar results was developed by Shin (1993) and has since
been used by Cain, Law and Peel (2001), Paton, Vaughan Williams and Fraser
(1999), and others. It assumes that bookmakers protect against potentially large
losses by requiring a risk premium that is proportional to odds; moreover they
take a higher margin in races withmore runners to recoup their losses to insiders.
This enables calculation of parameter, z, which is a measure of insider trading.
The calculation is briefly described as follows. Assume investors buy a
betting ticket that is a state contingent claim which pays the odds for a win and
nothing otherwise. For odds of k-to-l, the price of one unit of this claim, p
i
, is
equal to l/(k þ l); or 1/(Odds þ 1). If n is the number of runners in the race,
to be certain of obtaining one unit of payout, a bettor must buy n tickets for a
total cost of b ¼
P
n
i¼1
p
i
; b–1 is the bookmaker’s take or margin on the race
and should be positive. The normalized value of p
i
, p
˜
i
, is equal to p
i
;/b. The
objective probability that the horse will win, p
i
, is not observable.
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Following Cain, et al. (2001), the calculation of z for each race goes
through a number of iterative steps:
Select an initial estimate of z and make a first estimate of p
i
:
p
i
¼
z
2
4
*
ð12 zÞ
2
þ
p
2
i
b
*
ð12 zÞ
 
0:5
2
z
2
*
ð12 zÞ
 
ð5Þ
Obtain a revised estimate of z by substituting the estimate of p
i
into the
following equation:
z ¼ 12
X
n
i¼1
p
2
i
 !
21
b
*
X
n
i¼1
~
p
2
i
2
X
n
i¼1
p
2
i
 !
ð6Þ
Repeat the process until
P
n
i¼1
p
i
¼ 1 and z converges
3
.
3.2 Analytical Strategy and Hypotheses
A number of assumptions have shaped the analytical approach of this
study.
The first assumption is that insiders have access to more knowledge
than even the most skilled outsider. Thus, for instance, insiders will be
more accurate judges of a horse’s ability than the handicapper and racing
experts.
The handicapper’s objective is for all horses to finish together. Assuming
this objective is met, horses with different weights (and hence TAB numbers)
will have equal probability of winning: thus the median of winners’ TAB
numbers should be the median of all runners’ TAB numbers. If, however,
information about a winner’s ability is not generally available (but withheld
by insiders), winners will have a greater probability of success than expected
by the handicapper. Thus their handicap weight will be set too low, and
winners will have a higher TAB number than the median. This leads to the
hypothesis that the presence of insiders will be signaled by a median TAB
number of the winners of handicap races which is greater than the median for
all runners. Any increase in insider trading will lift winners’ TAB number.
Although tipsters’ forecasts are independent of the market, they are about
as accurate and so provide a measure of runners’ objective probability of
winning. This can be modeled using an expression such as:
EðmarketÞ ¼ aþ b:EðtipsterÞ þ 1ð7Þ
where E(market) and E(tipster) are the probabilities of winning established by
wagering market prices and tipster predictions, respectively, and a and b are
constants
4
.
Assume that tipsters’ forecast of the performance of any horse is
calculated following past practice (e.g. Bird and McCrae, 1987) by giving
three points if the horse is chosen to win, two points for second and one for
prediction of third place. Tipster probabilities are indicated by the weighted
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tips divided by the theoretical maximum support (which in this study is 78
because it reports forecasts of 13 tipsters who each have 3 þ 2 þ 1 points per
race). The values of a and b in equation (7) can be derived by regressing
market probabilities of a win calculated as per equation (2) against those from
tipster predictions.
If insiders successfully use information that is not generally available,
horses are more likely to win than expected by the market and experts. Should
insider trading increase, successful bets by insiders will reduce winners’
dividends relative to the probability established by tipsters (at least those
without the inside information) and this will be evidenced by a fall in b, and a
reduction in the explanatory power (i.e. adjusted R
2
) of equation (7).
Extending the discussion above, if each horse has an equal chance of
winning, the average dividend of winners of handicap races should be equal to
(1 2 Bookmaker or Tote Take)
*
Field Size. A lower dividend signals insider
knowledge; and an increase in insider trading will see the average winner
dividend fall.
Another assumption is that most insider bettors will prefer to bet close to
the start of the race. This is to allow the market to approach equilibrium, and
also to preserve their options to take a higher price. For insiders who bet on the
Tote (where all bettors receive the same odds), a further incentive to delay bets
is to avoid signaling superior knowledge to less informed bettors.
The pattern of bets will set up biases in the movement of odds. In a fully
efficient market with no constraints to either the supply or demand sides,
changes in prices should be random rises and falls. The Tote market, however,
is a closed system and this introduces an upwards bias into dividend
fluctuations. At the extreme, for instance, each bet leads to fall in one runner’s
dividend and a rise in all other runners’ dividends. Thus there will tend to be
more up than down moves in Tote dividends.
A somewhat different dynamic will apply in bookmaker markets because
they also have considerable supply-side influences as bookmakers manually
adjust prices in light of bets and competitor activity. Thus bookmakers tend to
initially post conservative odds to avoid possible adverse selection and raise
them through the betting session as demand for individual horses becomes
clear and competition reduces margins
5
.
In both the bookmaker and Tote markets, insider trades will be delayed,
and will be signaled by a greater proportion of falls in winners’ odds than in all
runners’ odds.
Moreover, bookmakers themselves can undertake insider trading by
reducing the odds they offer for a horse they think is likely to win and vice
versa. This would be evidenced by bookmaker dividends on winners that are
lower than on the Tote. An increase in insider trading would be evidenced by
an increase in the gap between bookmaker dividends on winners and those
paid by the Tote.
These assumptions point to 13 hypotheses that would signal the existence
and change in insider trading. Insider trading will be indicated by:
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H1a The proportion of downwards moves in the final fluctuation of
winners’ dividends on the Tote is greater than the proportion of
downwards moves for all runners
H1b The proportion of downwards moves in the final fluctuation of
winners’ dividends with bookmakers is greater than the
proportion of downwards moves for all runners
H2 TAB numbers of the winners of handicap races are higher than
the median of all runners
H3a Win dividends on the Tote for winners of handicap races are
lower than the value of (1 2 Tote Take)
*
Field Size.
H3b Win dividends with bookmakers for winners of handicap races
are lower than the value of (1 2 Bookmaker Take)
*
Field Size.
H4 The value of z per Shin’s methodology is greater than zero
Further hypotheses are that an increase in the extent of insider trading will be
indicated by:
H5 An increase in the proportion of downwards moves in the final
fluctuation of winners’ odds with bookmakers (and the Tote)
H6 An increase in the TAB number of the winners of handicap
races
H7a A decrease in the dividend on the Tote for winners of handicap
races.
H7b A decrease in the dividend paid by bookmakers for winners of
handicap races.
H8 An increase in the value of TAB Dividend minus Bookmaker
Dividend
H9 Reduced explanatory power of tipsters’ predictions
H10 The value of z per Shin’s methodology will increase
Let us now discuss the data used to test these hypotheses before turning to the
results.
3.3 Data for this Study
The study is conducted using results for thoroughbred race meetings in
Melbourne, which is a city of three million people that is located in south-
eastern Australia. It supports four metropolitan racetracks with a thoroughbred
horseracing program at one track each Saturday and usually on one other day
during the week. In Melbourne the tote is run by TABCORP Holdings Limited
(hereafter Tabcorp), which is a listed public company that provides gambling
at casinos and other venues including sports betting offices on and off-course.
Analysis was confined to Saturday meetings as tipster predictions are not
available on other days. Data were compiled for a total of 3,540 races during
the period January 1996 to June 2004, and came from four sources. The first
was a commercial service, Southcoast Database, which provided field data
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including: date of the meeting, and name of the venue; the number of the race
and its classification (class and whether it is a handicap); and the following
information for all runners: the name of each starter and its TAB number,
finishing position, bookmaker starting price and fluctuations in dividends prior
to the start. Tabcorp win dividends for all runners after January 2000 were
obtained from Thoroughbred Racing Bureau [www.trb.com.au]; and
fluctuations in Tabcorp dividends of all runners after October 2002 were
provided by another commercial researcher, Mr. Martin McGrath
[www.raceguides.com.au].
The fourth source involved hand collection of data. These comprised the
TAB win dividend for the winner of each race between 1996 and 2000 from
the Sunday edition of The Age (a Melbourne daily newspaper); and the
predictions of placegetters in each race between 1996 and 2004 that were
made by 13 tipsters published in the Saturday editions of The Age and
The Australian (a national newspaper published in Sydney) which,
respectively, publish six and seven tipsters (one in The Australian is a
computer based expert system called Computercard)
6
.
Data on winners, tipsters and bookmaker markets were available for the
period January 1996 to June 2004; however, Tote dividends for horses that did
not win were only available after January 2000, and fluctuations only since
2002
7
. Thus the analysis has been divided into two roughly equal periods –
January 1996 to December 1999, and January 2000 to June 2004 – for
evaluation of changes over time and to enable comparability of bookmaker
and Tote data during the second period.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The analysis tested the hypothesized measures of insider trading, and the
principal findings shown in Table 1 provide statistically significant
(p , 0.05) support for nine of the 13 hypotheses. There is convincing
evidence that insiders are active in the Melbourne wagering market, and their
level of their activity has grown over the last decade.
4.1 Existence of Insider Activity
Hypotheses 1a and 1b are that insiders bet late (to keep their options open
and prevent herding by outsiders) and thus the proportion of downwards
fluctuations in the final move of winners’ dividends in the Tote and
bookmaker markets will be higher than for other runners. Hypothesis 5 is that
greater insider activity will be signaled by an increase in the proportion of
downwards final moves in bookmaker odds.
As shown in Table 2 bookmaker markets display strong (p , 0.001)
evidence of insider trading: whilst only 28 percent of the final fluctuations for
all runners were down, 44 percent of winners’ final fluctuations were down.
This proportion dropped slightly during the period, although not with
statistical significance (p . 0.3).
THE JOURNAL OF GAMBLING BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS2007, 1 1
42
T
A
B
L
E
1
S
U
M
M
A
R
Y
O
F
S
T
U
D
Y
F
I
N
D
I
N
G
S
T
h
i
s
t
a
b
l
e
l
i
s
t
s
t
h
e
1
3
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
p
a
p
e
r
w
h
i
c
h
–
a
s
s
h
o
w
n
i
n
p
a
n
e
l
A
-
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
t
h
e
e
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
o
f
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
i
n
M
e
l
b
o
u
r
n
e
t
h
o
r
o
u
g
h
b
r
e
d
w
a
g
e
r
i
n
g
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
,
a
n
d
–
a
s
s
h
o
w
n
i
n
p
a
n
e
l
B
–
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
a
n
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
.
T
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
f
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
a
r
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
f
a
r
r
i
g
h
t
c
o
l
u
m
n
a
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
v
e
o
f
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
o
r
n
o
t
f
o
r
t
h
e
e
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
o
f
,
a
n
d
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
,
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
.
L
e
v
e
l
s
o
f
c
o
n
fi
d
e
n
c
e
a
r
e
s
h
o
w
n
,
w
i
t
h
*
*
*
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
9
9
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
c
o
n
fi
d
e
n
c
e
,
*
*
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
9
5
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
a
n
d
*
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
9
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
c
o
n
fi
d
e
n
c
e
.
H
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
i
s
W
i
n
M
a
r
k
e
t
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
s
I
n
s
i
d
e
r
s
?
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
t
h
e
E
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
o
f
I
n
s
i
d
e
r
T
r
a
d
i
n
g
1
a
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
o
f
d
o
w
n
w
a
r
d
s
m
o
v
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
fi
n
a
l
fl
u
c
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
w
i
n
n
e
r
s
’
T
a
b
c
o
r
p
o
d
d
s
G
r
e
a
t
e
r
t
h
a
n
m
e
a
n
f
o
r
a
l
l
r
u
n
n
e
r
s
Y
e
s
*
*
*
1
b
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
o
f
d
o
w
n
w
a
r
d
s
m
o
v
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
fi
n
a
l
fl
u
c
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
w
i
n
n
e
r
s
’
b
o
o
k
m
a
k
e
r
o
d
d
s
G
r
e
a
t
e
r
t
h
a
n
m
e
a
n
f
o
r
a
l
l
r
u
n
n
e
r
s
Y
e
s
*
*
*
2
M
e
d
i
a
n
T
A
B
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
w
i
n
n
e
r
s
o
f
h
a
n
d
i
c
a
p
r
a
c
e
s
H
i
g
h
e
r
t
h
a
n
m
e
d
i
a
n
o
f
a
l
l
r
u
n
n
e
r
s
N
o
*
*
*
3
a
T
a
b
c
o
r
p
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
o
f
w
i
n
n
e
r
s
o
f
h
a
n
d
i
c
a
p
r
a
c
e
s
L
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
(
1
2
T
a
b
c
o
r
p
T
a
k
e
)
*
F
i
e
l
d
S
i
z
e
Y
e
s
*
*
3
b
B
o
o
k
m
a
k
e
r
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
o
f
w
i
n
n
e
r
s
o
f
h
a
n
d
i
c
a
p
r
a
c
e
s
L
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
(
1
2
B
o
o
k
m
a
k
e
r
s
’
T
a
k
e
)
*
F
i
e
l
d
S
i
z
e
Y
e
s
*
*
*
4
T
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
S
h
i
n
’
s
z
G
r
e
a
t
e
r
t
h
a
n
z
e
r
o
Y
e
s
*
*
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
a
n
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
t
h
e
L
e
v
e
l
o
f
I
n
s
i
d
e
r
T
r
a
d
i
n
g
5
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
o
f
d
o
w
n
w
a
r
d
s
m
o
v
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
fi
n
a
l
fl
u
c
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
w
i
n
n
e
r
s
’
b
o
o
k
m
a
k
e
r
o
d
d
s
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
Y
e
s
6
M
e
d
i
a
n
T
A
B
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
t
h
e
w
i
n
n
e
r
s
o
f
h
a
n
d
i
c
a
p
r
a
c
e
s
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
Y
e
s
*
*
7
a
D
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
o
n
T
a
b
c
o
r
p
o
f
w
i
n
n
e
r
s
i
n
h
a
n
d
i
c
a
p
r
a
c
e
s
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
Y
e
s
7
b
D
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
w
i
t
h
b
o
o
k
m
a
k
e
r
s
o
f
w
i
n
n
e
r
s
i
n
h
a
n
d
i
c
a
p
r
a
c
e
s
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
Y
e
s
*
*
8
V
a
l
u
e
o
f
T
A
B
D
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
m
i
n
u
s
B
o
o
k
m
a
k
e
r
D
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
Y
e
s
*
*
*
9
A
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
i
p
s
t
e
r
s
t
o
p
i
c
k
w
i
n
n
e
r
s
E
x
p
l
a
n
a
t
o
r
y
p
o
w
e
r
f
a
l
l
s
Y
e
s
*
*
1
0
T
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
S
h
i
n
’
s
z
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
Y
e
s
JUST HOW SERIOUS IS INSIDER TRADING?
43
Results for Tabcorp betting show a similar pattern: although 36.6 percent
of all runners’ final dividend moves were down, the figure was 45.9 percent
for winners, which is also highly significant (p , 0.001).
Hypotheses 2 and 6 are that handicaps ensure runners finish together so
that the median of TAB numbers for winners should be the same as that for all
runners. Under hypothesis 2, insider trading will be evidenced by the winners’
median TAB number above the median for all runners; and hypothesis 6
expects an increase in winners’ TAB numbers if insider activity strengthens.
Table 3 conclusively rejects hypothesis 2: the median TAB number for
winners is 5.0, which is significantly (p , 0.001) below the 7.1 for all
runners; thus horses perform better than expected by the handicapper. This is
clearly not supportive of insider trading. However, it is consistent with a
conservative bias by the handicapper who underweights promising runners.
Conversely the table shows a significant (p , 0.05) increase in winners’
TAB number across the two sub-periods and hence confirms hypothesis 6
(assuming the apparent handicapper bias is constant).
The next set of hypotheses to be tested also assumes that – in the absence
of insider trading - each runner has an equal probability of winning.
Hypotheses 3a and 3b are that the expected dividend is the value of one minus
operator’s take multiplied by the average number of starters in each race. The
takes for Tabcorp and bookmakers are 16.9 and 20.0 percent, respectively
8
;
and there is an average of 11.0 runners in each race. Thus – in the absence of
any bias - the expected win dividends are $9.1 with Tabcorp and $8.8 with
bookmakers.
TABLE 2
PROPORTION OF DOWNWARDS MOVES IN THE FINAL FLUCTUATION OF WINNERS’ DIVIDENDS
This table reports results for tests of Hypotheses 1a and 1b, and 5. Insider trading is evidenced
by a higher than expected proportion of downwards moves in the final fluctuation of winners
dividend; and the proportion would rise in line with the level of insider activity. Dividends are
recorded at up to four stages in the betting, and this table reports mean values of the final
fluctuation in winners’ dividends before betting stops. For both Tote and bookmaker markets, if
there were no manipulation the pattern of winners’ final fluctuations will be the same as that for
all runners. In each case the last fluctuation is assumed to be a binomial rise-or-fall distribution
whose standard deviation is given by
p
[mean*(1 2 mean)/(sample size)]
Tote (Tabcorp) Bookmakers
Null Hypothesis Value: mean for all runners 36.6 27.8
January 1996 to December 1999 (3540 races) [data not available] 44.4
January 2000 to June 2004 [data not available] 43.6
October 2002 to August 2004 (799 races) 45.9
Full Sample Period
Mean 45.9 44.0
Sample standard deviation 1.70 0.75
t-statistic 5.5 31.4
Significance 0.001 0.001
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Table 4 supports hypotheses 3a and 3b with win dividends significantly
(p , 0.05) lower than expected for both Tabcorp and bookmakers at $8.8 and
8.1, respectively. The data also support hypothesis 7b with a significant
(p , 0.005) fall in bookmaker win dividends. Although the fall in Tabcorp
odds during the study period is consistentwith hypothesis 7a, it is not significant
(p . 0.3).
The data also strongly support (p , 0.001) hypothesis 8 that an increase
in insider trading will reduce bookmaker odds relative to Tabcorp odds.
Hypothesis 9 is based on the assumption that the probability of winning as
assessed by Tote and bookmaker markets will have a consistent relationship
with the probability of winning as assessed by tipsters. Any increase in insider
activity will reduce the value of publicly available information; this, in turn,
will see markets give a higher probability of winning relative to tipsters, and
reduce the explanatory ability of tipsters. Table 5 shows that tipsters’
predictive power has declined: win probabilities in both wagering markets
rose significantly (p , 0.001) relative to the probability of winning predicted
by tipsters. This strongly supports hypothesis 9.
4.2 Quantification of Insider Activity
The longshot bias (or tendency for the expected return to be proportional
to outcome probability) in the Tote market is - as per equation (3) - a measure
TABLE 3
TAB NUMBERS OF WINNERS
This table reports results for tests of Hypotheses 2 and 6 which are based on the assumption that
handicaps ensure runners finish together. Thus the median of TAB numbers (which are based
on descending order of weight handicap) for winners should be the same as the median for
all runners. Hypothesis 2 assumes insider trading will be evidenced by winner TAB number
above the median for all runners, and hypothesis 6 expects an increase in the gap if insider
activity strengthens.
Median TAB Number of:
Winners (N ¼ 3,442)
All Runners (Null hypothesis
value)
January 1996 to December
1999
4.93 7.08
January 2000 to June
2004
5.07 7.00
January 1996 to June
2004
Median value 5.00 7.06
Population standard deviation 4.13
Sample standard deviation 0.071
Actual – Null hypothesis value 2.06
t-statistic 29.3
Significance 0.001
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of insider betting. Table 6 reports a pronounced longshot bias, and applying
equation (4) to the dataset shows that insiders place 1.9 percent of wagers on
winners that pay a dividend of less than $5, and about 0.4 percent of all bets.
Table 7 reports estimates of insider trading in bookmaker wagering
markets, z, using the methodology proposed by Shin (1993); and also shows
results from regression of z against various race traits as independent variables.
Panel B reports the extent of insider trading: the value of z was 2.3 percent
in 1996–1999, and 2.1 percent in 2000–2004. The mean across the whole
period of about 2.2 percent is not significantly different to values for English
racing in 1978 and 1987 reported by Cain, et al. (2003) of 2.7 to 3.3 percent;
and in 1991 by Shin (1993) of 2.0 to 2.6 percent.
Panel C explains the contributors to insider trading in bookmakermarkets by
reporting results of linear regression using z as the dependent variable, and race
date, number of runners, TABnumber, bookmaker SP,b and race stakemoney as
the independent variables (the last three are generally seen as influencing z).
Almost 90 percent of the variation in z is explained by three highly significant
(p , 0.02) variables: number of runners in the race, beta and race stake money.
4.3 Alternative Explanations
Although the results above are strongly – and consistently – indicative of
the existence of insider bettors and an increase in their activity, it is not
TABLE 4
DIVIDENDS PAID ON WINNERS
This table reports results for tests of Hypotheses 3a and 3b, and 7a and 7b. The assumption is
that handicaps ensure that each runner has an equal probability of winning and hence the
expected dividend is the proportion paid from the pool (i.e. one minus operator’s take)
multiplied by the average number of starters in each race. The takes for Tabcorp and
bookmakers are 16.9 and 20.0 percent, respectively; and there is an average of 11.0 runners in
each race (11.2 in 1996–2000, and 10.9 in 2000–2004). Hypotheses 3 a and b are that – in the
absence of any bias - the expected win dividends are $9.14 on Tabcorp and $8.80 with
bookmakers. Lower values indicate insider activity. Hypotheses 7 a and b are that the dividends
decrease if insider activity increases.
Tabcorp Bookmakers Tabcorp 2 Bookmaker
Null Hypothesis value 9.14 8.80 0.34
January 1996 to December 1999 8.88 8.25 0.63
January 2000 to June 2004 8.75 7.88 0.84
t-statistic 0.53 2.18 2.40
Significance 0.60 0.03 0.02
January 1996 to June 2004
Mean 8.81 8.06 0.74
Population standard deviation 9.95 7.18 3.72
Sample standard deviation 0.170 0.122 0.063
Actual – Null Hypothesis Value 20.33 0.74 0.40
t-statistic 1.9 6.1 6.3
Significance 0.05 0.001 0.001
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possible to exclude other explanations. Two obvious examples are changes in
publicly available information and in reliability of horses’ performance.
In the first case, there could have been a decrease during the last decade in
the amount of information that is publicly available about horses’ prospects.
As a result, insider information would comprise a larger – and hence more
valuable – component of the information about any horse’s prospects of
winning. Such a development is hard to accept given the data that has emerged
from better technology (such as cable television broadcasts and computer
analysis of races) and more intense coverage by a wider range of analysts and
media. It is also inconsistent with what appears to be greater energy by the
stewards to improve transparency.
Similarly there could have been a systematic decrease in the reliability of
horses’ performance due (say) to changes in breeding, training or field quality.
If horses were less likely to run according to their historical form, insider
information becomes more valuable and the predictive ability of publicly
available information would fall. Exactly this, of course, is shown in Table 5
TABLE 5
PERFORMANCE OF TIPSTERS
Hypothesis 9 is based on the assumption that an increase in insider activity will reduce the
explanatory ability of tipsters. It uses the expression: E(market) ¼ Intercept þ
Slope*E(Tipster) þ1, where: E(market) and E(Tipster) are the probabilities that any horse
will win based on wagering market odds and tipster predictions; E(market) is calculated as
Dividend/(1 2 Tabcorp or bookmaker take); and E(Tipster) is the weighted value of tips for
each winner (with 3 for a win, 2 for 2
nd
and 1 for 3
rd
) divided by the theoretical maximum
tipster support of 78. An increase in insider activity will reduce the value of publicly available
information and reduce the explanatory ability of tipsters: thus R
2
should fall and Slope should
rise. Panel A of this table reports results for Tabcorp, and those for bookmakers are shown in
panel B.
Intercept Slope Adjusted R
2
Panel A: Tabcorp Odds
January 1996 to December 1999 0.061 0.541 0.372
January 2000 to June 2004 0.069 0.633 0.320
January 1996 to June 2004 0.069 0.566 0.330
Standard error 0.0136
Change from 1996–99 to 2000–4 0.092
t-statistic 6.8
Significance 0.001
Panel B: Bookmaker Odds
January 1996 to December 1999 0.063 0.464 0.369
January 2000 to June 2004 0.0724 0.533 0.316
January 1996 to June 2004 0.070 0.481 0.328
Standard error 0.0112
Change from 1996–99 to 2000–4 0.069
t-statistic 6.2
Significance 0.001
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as a decline in tipsters’ accuracy and in Table 3 as a decline in handicappers’
efficiency. Thus it is not possible to reject declining reliability as an
explanation of these results. However, it seems improbable, in particular
because of the growing economic importance of the horse racing industry in
Australia (Gordon, 2001).
In summary the data provide statistically significant support for nine of
the 13 hypotheses; directionally support a further three hypotheses; and reject
one hypothesis. Let us discuss the implications of these findings in the
following section.
5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The key research questions of this paper are: is there conclusive evidence
of insider trading in thoroughbred wagering markets? And has the level
changed through the last decade? Satisfactory answers to both questions can
be found in the data reported in the previous section. This provided
statistically significant (p , 0.05) confirmation of five of the six hypotheses
relating to the existence of insider trading and four of the seven hypotheses
relating to an increase in insider trading.
TABLE 6
LONGSHOT BIAS IN TOTE MARKET AND LEVEL OF INSIDER TRADING ACTIVITY
The table below uses data from the Tote market during 2000–2004 to reveal the strength of the
longshot bias, or tendency for expected return to be inversely proportional to outcome
probability. This data is then used to derive an estimate of the Objective Probability of Winning
as a function of Dividend.
Dividend
range 2 $ Runners Winners
Objective
Win
Probability
Average
Dividend
of Winners
Subjective
Win
Probability
Expected
return (%)
,1.5 36 25 0.694 1.40 0.583 (2.78)
1.6–2.6 439 167 0.380 2.19 0.377 (16.61)
2.7–3.7 990 274 0.277 3.20 0.260 (11.34)
3.8–4.6 1033 225 0.218 4.20 0.199 (8.59)
4.7–6.3 2044 327 0.160 5.45 0.154 (12.78)
6.4–8.0 1925 225 0.117 7.11 0.118 (16.91)
8.1–10.2 2057 199 0.097 9.09 0.092 (12.11)
10.3–12.5 1804 153 0.085 11.30 0.074 (4.16)
12.6–16.5 2117 110 0.052 14.27 0.059 (25.84)
16.6–23.9 2386 90 0.038 19.48 0.043 (26.52)
24–39.9 2546 78 0.031 30.31 0.028 (7.14)
40–435 3241 31 0.010 59.56 0.014 (43.03)
TOTAL 20618 1,904 0.092 8.76 0.096 (19.12)
Memo: $5
or less
3006 778 0.259 3.40 0.245 (11.96)
Regression of Objective Probability of Winning against Dividend:
Objective Probability, p ¼ 0.9371
*
Dividend
21.0378
[Adjusted R
2
¼ 0.996]
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Wagering markets clearly show biases that are to be expected from the
existence of appreciable levels of insider trading. For instance, in both the
bookmaker and Tote markets, there is a much higher proportion of downwards
moves in the final fluctuation of a winning horse’s dividend than in the final
fluctuation of all runners’ dividends (which evidences a disproportionate late
flow of informed investments).
Over time the biases predicted from insider trading have strengthened. The
proportion of downwards moves in final fluctuations rose; and the predictive
power of tipsters and the handicapper fell. Dividends paid for a win by
bookmakers and Tote both dropped, and by a greater proportion in the
bookmaker market.
An important change has been the decline in the value of publicly
available information. The implication of this result for outsiders is
demonstrated by reference to a typical high probability runner which eight
out of 13 tipsters predict to win. In the period 1996 to 2000, this would pay a
dividend of around $3.7 on the Tote and $3.9 with bookmakers. In the second
period, however, the same level of tipster support results in dividends of $3.2
and 3.4, respectively. In the first period, the betting markets assign a
probability of winning of about 23 percent to a horse that eight tipsters have
picked to win; in the second period the probability is around 27 percent. Thus
the expected return at this particular level of skill has fallen by about one sixth
over eight years. In other words, the return from a given quantum of publicly
available information has fallen: private information that is not impounded in
tipster predictions has become more valuable.
The extent of insider trading was quantified in the bookmaker and Tote
markets using different methodologies. This showed that insiders place 2.2
percent of bets in the bookmaker market, and 0.4 percent in the (much larger)
Tote market.
Insider trading has been a roughly constant share of the (declining)
bookmaker market since the mid 1990s. The extent of insider activity is
highest in races with small fields and large stakes which contradicts results
from studies in the UK (Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1997).
Although the estimate that around two percent of bets are placed by
insiders might appear small, it is consistent with the findings of a number of
other studies including Cain, et al. (2001), Shin (1993), Terrell (1997) and
Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997). Moreover it is important to note that
tests in a number of settings have shown that a relatively small volume of
informed investments can move markets. For instance, Lopes (1994) reports
evidence from the University of Iowa’s Presidential Stock Market that a small
group of marginal traders influenced the market price. This, of course, is how
markets produce relatively unbiased estimates, even in the presence of many
uninformed investors.
The data point to a number of changes that have taken place in the
wagering market in parallel with increased insider activity. One of the most
important is shown in Table 8: short-priced horses have a growing probability
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of winning. In the early years of the study horses starting at a bookmaker win
dividend of $3 or less won 13.7 percent of races; they now win 15.0 percent of
races. This result is consistent with increased insider trading (more money is
placed on winning horses) which results in lower dividends offered by
bookmakers. Moreover, the expected return from betting with bookmakers at
all dividend levels has fallen by about three percent. This does not seem to be
due to an increase in the bookmakers’ margin which – as per Table 7 - stayed
roughly constant.
To answer the question posed in the title of this paper, my results confirm
other data that around two percent of wagering investments are by insiders;
and empirical measures of insider trading show that it has increased
significantly in the last decade. There is little doubt that insider trading is a
serious and growing issue in the thoroughbred wagering market.
Because the wagering market appears to be competitive, efficient and
well-regulated, the level of insider activity identified in this study is likely to
be qualitatively similar to that in conventional financial markets. Although no
study has quantified insider activity in equity markets, the papers discussed in
section I found that insiders make between a third and half of stock trades
when monopoly information is valuable to investors. This is not inconsistent
with the implication that several percent of all trades involve insiders.
Leaving aside considerations of ethics and equity, the presence of even a
small proportion of insiders has serious financial implications for outsider
investors. Consider high probability runners in a wagering market that start at
a win dividend of $5 or less. As shown in Table 6, the Tote market gives them
a 0.245 subjective probability of winning, which means that 24.5 percent of
wagers are on these runners; they have an expected return of 212 percent.
Assume that i percent of wagers are placed by insiders on the winners at an
average dividend of $3.4; the return to insiders is 240 percent (i.e. a net return
of $3.4 minus the $1 bet). Winners paying $5 or less attract 24.5 percent of all
bets; insiders comprise i percent of bets and earn 240 percent; outsiders make
24.5–i percent of bets; and the average return is 212 percent. Thus:
Return to all bettors¼½i
*
240þð24:52 iÞ
*
ðReturn to OutsidersÞ	=24:5¼212:
Therefore : Return to Outsiders¼2ð294þ240iÞ=ð24:52 iÞ:
In a strongly efficient market where i ¼ 0, outsider bettors could expect a
return of minus 12 percent from backing horses starting at $5 or less.
However, when insiders make just one percent of bets on the winners, the
return to outsiders falls to minus 23 percent (and goes to minus 47 percent
where insiders make three percent of successful bets).
If insiders are also responsible for several percent of trades in other
markets, there will be a similarly significant fall in returns to outsider
investors. This should strengthen the resolve of regulators to stamp out
unscrupulous operators in every market.
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The conclusion that insiders remain active in financial markets and can
enjoy substantial monopoly profits should not be a surprise. For instance, a
common investment strategy has been to follow the lead of officers who
disclose trades in their companies as these provide significant excess returns.
In a typical study, Seyhun (1986) analyzed a large volume of trades by
corporate officers in the United States in the late 1970s and found an
outperformance of up to about seven percent per year. He estimated (page 201)
that these publicly disclosed trades by corporate officers comprise between 0.8
and 4.0 percent of all trades, and the proportion is inversely related to firm
size. Friederich, Gregory, John and Tonks (2002) reached a similar conclusion
in the United Kingdom.
An interesting question which is raised by this study is the extent to which
insider trading would set up quantifiable biases in other markets. As discussed
earlier, insider trading is a sufficient explanation for the longshot bias in
wagering markets. What impact would insider trading have on equities
markets? And on other markets? Students of behavioral finance may advance
their discipline by developing additional hypotheses that evidence such
impacts and test for their existence.
Despite the large dataset used here and considerable effort expended in its
evaluation, a number of areas remain for further research. First, the analysis
could be extended along lines proposed by Law and Peel (2001) to distinguish
herd behavior from insider trading, possibly by considering the nature of
plunges. Another extension following Vaughan Williams and Paton (1998) is
to separately analyze higher quality races with qualitatively superior public
information to see if insider activity is diminished. Finally it would be
interesting to replicate this analysis in other markets where data are available
(e.g. Hong Kong, New Zealand, UK and USA) to compare international
experience of the extent and changes in insider trading.
TABLE 8
OBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES OF WINNING
Panel A shows the objective probability that a horse within a particular range of bookmaker
odds will win. This is calculated by dividing all runners according to the range of odds, and
calculating the proportion of winners (i.e. winners*100/runners) within each range. Panel B
shows the percentage of all winners falling within each odds range.
Bookmakers’ Win Dividend - $
# 2.0 2.1–3.0 3.1–9.9 $ 10
Panel A: Objective Probability of Winning by Dividend – percent
1996–2000 47.2 33.7 15.0 3.8
2000–2004 64.4 37.4 15.3 3.8
Panel B: Percent of Winners
1996–2000 2.9 10.8 60.5 25.8
2000–2004 3.1 11.1 60.8 25.0
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NOTES
1. Based on several samples during 2003–4, my estimate of the proportions of the final Tote pool which are
wagered at 15 minutes before the start, five minutes before the start and one minute before the start
(which is the last time odds are reported before betting is closed) are 30, 60 and 80 percent, respectively.
This was confirmed by the Melbourne pari-mutuel operator, Tabcorp, who responded [personal
communication, 15 September 2004] to my e-mail enquiry: “the investment percentages you are quoting
(30–60%) would generally occur within the last 2–3 minutes [before the start of the race].”
2. There are other possible explanations for the longshot bias such as bettors’ over-estimation of the
probability of occurrence of low frequency events, or their assumption of an equal risk-weighted return
from wagering and preference for the small chance of a large win (Coleman, 2004). Moreover some of
the bias may be caused by herd behaviour, rather than true insiders; and some insider bets may not go to
the winner. The assumption that insiders are the sole cause of the longshot bias makes the resulting
estimate of insider activity a maximum.
3. The analysis in this paper was performed using Excel: races where b , 1 were eliminated; then data for
each race were first grouped by number of runners, and values were calculated for p
i
,
~
p
i
, and b; the
goalseek function was used to vary z so that
P
n
i¼1
p
i
¼ 1.
4. Alternatively historical data for all runners can be used to establish a probability of winning based on
tipsters’ predictions. Thus E(market) and E(tipster) can be treated as independent estimates of each
winner’s probability of success, and values of RMSE for each pair can be calculated and compared
between periods. If insider activity had altered, RMSE should change, too.
5. However, note that Gabriel and Marsden (1990: 878) state – without any amplification – “we would
expect [bettors with inside information] to place early fixed odds bets with bookmakers”.
6. In addition, of course, there are at least as many tipsters available from private tipping services (provided
by fax or e-mail), ‘late mail’, newswire services (particularly Australian Associated Press) and specialist
publications (such as Best Bets and The Sportsman). Fortunately, several newspaper tipsters are
syndicated from other media, so there is some crossover.
7. Although Tabcorp operations are computerised, it does not retain (or at least will not provide researchers
with) electronic files of race results. These are only available race by race on its website
[www.tabracing.com.au] after August 2002.
8. These are my calculations using data in this analysis. According to Tabcorp [www.tab.com.au/cms/
betrules/Parimutuel_BetRules.pdf] the “return to investor” (which is not defined) in Victoria in recent
years has varied between 14.5 and 16 percent. Tasmanian Gaming Commission (2003) assumes a
bookmaker take of five percent, but does not provide any justification.
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